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Abstract
We show that competitive markets protect consumers from many forms of exploitation, even
when consumers have non-standard preferences. We analyze a competitive dynamic economy in
which consumers have arbitrary time-separable preferences and arbitrary beliefs about their own
future behavior. Competition among agents eliminates rents and protects vulnerable consumers,
who could have been exploited by a monopolist. In fact, in competitive general equilibrium no
consumer participates in a trading sequence that strictly reduces her endowment { there are no
Dutch Books. The absence of Dutch Books in and of itself does not distinguish standard and
non-standard preferences. However, non-standard preferences do generate qualitatively di￿erent
equilibrium outcomes than standard preferences. We characterize the testable implications of
the standard model with a dynamic generalization of the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences.
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1.1 Overview
Economists use Dutch Book | aka money pump | arguments to rule out certain types of
tastes and/or beliefs.1 A typical argument proceeds in three steps.
1. Suppose a consumer had exotic preferences.
2. Then the consumer would participate in a series of self-impoverishing trades referred to as a
Dutch Book or a money pump.
The third step in the argument comes in two di￿erent versions:
3a. Self-impoverishing trades will bankrupt the consumer, implying that such consumers will not
play an important role in the economy.
3b. Self-impoverishing trades are empirically uncommon, so preferences that imply such trades
must also be uncommon.
The current paper focuses on the implicit assumptions that are necessary to support point
two in the argument.2 Although Dutch Book arguments are often made by proponents of the
competitive markets model (e.g., Becker (2002)), Dutch Book arguments are rarely embedded in
a market context. In practice, step two usually posits the existence of a trader who is able to
make o￿ers to an isolated consumer. The trader constructing the Dutch Book has a monopoly
relationship with the consumer being booked.
This paper shows the limited scope of the Dutch Book argument in competitive general equi-
librium. Competitive markets protect consumers because suppliers of Dutch Books must compete
1See Becker (2002), Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Yaari (1985), and references therein.
2There are also some problems with step 3. Step 3a implies that bankruptcy is not an important topic, but if
utility matters instead of wealth, then impoverished consumers | supported by the welfare state or starving for lack
of support | should matter for economic analysis. Step 3b implies that swindles are infrequent, but this remains
an open question (see Le￿ 1976).
1with one another to attract customers/victims. Though there may exist price vectors that support
Dutch Books, none of these price vectors satisfy market-clearing competitive equilibrium conditions.
Even if consumers have non-standard preferences (e.g., intransitive, dynamically inconsistent, etc.),
they will not get Dutch Booked. To our knowledge, practically all of the preferences that have been
described as vulnerable to a Dutch Book are in fact invulnerable once one eliminates the monopoly
power of the trader constructing the Dutch Book.
Formally, we consider a dynamic general equilibrium endowment economy with heterogeneous
participants characterized by monotonic, concave, and time separable preferences. We allow agents
to have arbitrary dynamically inconsistent preferences as well as mistaken beliefs about their own
future preferences. For every path of prices, each agent is characterized by a demand pro￿le
derived from an intrapersonal game. A general equilibrium is then comprised of a price path
and intrapersonal equilibrium demand pro￿les for all participants, such that all (time-contingent)
markets clear. Adapting the methods of Luttmer and Marriotti (2006), we show (in Theorem 1)
that a general equilibrium exists.
We de￿ne two types of Dutch Books. An equilibrium demonstrates money making Dutch
Books if there exists a sequence of equilibrium trades that leave at least one agent with a strictly
dominating sequence of consumption claims. Analogously, an equilibrium demonstrates money
losing Dutch Books if there exists a sequence of equilibrium trades that leave at least one agent
with a strictly dominated sequence of consumption claims.
As long as preferences are time separable, Walras’ law holds, despite the fact that preferences
are dynamically inconsistent and beliefs about future behavior may be inaccurate. Walras’ law
implies that no agent loses wealth, so no agent can gain wealth, eliminating both types of Dutch
Books (Theorem 2).
Partial time separability of preferences turns out to be crucial to the argument. We show that
Dutch Books can exist in competitive equilibrium if preferences are non-separable. Nonetheless,
such Dutch Books are fragile in the sense that the Dutch Book can only exist if there are no time
separable goods. Intuitively, if there is at least one time-separable good, the agent would always
2prefer to consume more of it than to dispose of wealth.
Transaction costs provide another conceptual challenge, since Walras’ Law does not apply in
such settings. The existence of transaction costs will revive Dutch Books in some economies that we
study. However, Dutch Books will not arise in economies with transaction costs as long as agents
hold accurate beliefs about their future preferences. Such sophisticated agents will anticipate
sequences of trade that cause them to be worse o￿ in every period and will consequently choose to
avoid such sequences in equilibrium.
If markets do not \screen" non-standard preferences and beliefs, it is natural to ask whether the
existence of such non-standard behavior will have any e￿ect on competitive market outcomes. If
the answer to this question were negative, then the standard time consistent model would serve as
a good as if model of competitive markets. The last part of the paper is targeted at identifying the
testable implications of the general equilibrium model with standard time consistent preferences
and accurate beliefs.
As it turns out, given a single set of equilibrium prices and quantities one can always construct
a model with dynamically consistent preferences that rationalizes the data. However, such a model
would not necessarily correctly predict out of sample behavior. Observing data from numerous
economies with identical preferences and di￿erent endowments generates testable restrictions for
dynamically consistent models.
Intuitively, consider each time period’s (single) good as a separate good, so that observing
prices and demands over time in a collection of dynamic economies is akin to observing prices
and demands for bundles of goods in a collection of static economies. Afriat (1967) provided
necessary and su￿cient conditions for the existence of a well-behaved utility function that would
generate such a data set. These conditions are captured by a generalized version of the axiom of
revealed preferences. If economic data satisfy these conditions, then a time-consistent model can
be constructed to explain the data. Consequently, the necessary and su￿cient conditions for the
existence of a time-consistent model that generates a ￿nite data set is a dynamic version of the
generalized axiom of revealed preferences. Our results of Section 6 (and Theorem 4 in particular)
3illustrate the potential importance of studying dynamically inconsistent preferences and beliefs in
economic contexts.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The section that follows reviews the related literature on Dutch Books. Section 3 provides
an example that motivates our analysis and illustrates our results. Section 4 describes a general
endowment economy with complete, competitive futures markets and non-standard agents. It also
illustrates the existence of an equilibrium in such environments. Section 5 shows that Dutch
Books will not arise in competitive equilibrium, while Section 6 provides a characterization of the
restrictions implied by dynamically consistent preferences on observable prices and quantities and
demonstrates the observational non-equivalence between dynamically consistent and dynamically
inconsistent economies. In Section 7 we discuss the robustness of our results, considering issues
like non-separability and transaction costs. Section 8 concludes. Most technical proofs are in the
Appendices.
2 Dutch Book Literature
Dutch Books were originally applied to probability updating. De Finetti’s (1937) treaty on the
theory of probability showed that people whose beliefs satisfy the laws of probability are invul-
nerable to Dutch Books. Ramsey (1931) noted the reverse implication { people whose beliefs are
inconsistent with the laws of probability are vulnerable to Dutch Books. The recent literature
has identi￿ed preferences that yield Dutch Books. Yaari (1985) and Green (1987) study violations
of the independence axiom. Mulligan (1996) studies dynamically inconsistent time preferences.
These papers assume that a single rational agent can make a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it o￿ers
to a second, \irrational" agent.
There have been a few reassessments of the Dutch Book literature. Machina (1989) points
out that Dutch Book arguments \snip" the decision tree just before the current choice node and
recalculate the optimal continuation. Machina critiques this consequentialist assumption and
4argues that Dutch Book arguments should only be applied to time separable problems, which is
the setting of the current paper.3
Border and Segal (1994, 2002) consider an oddsmaking environment, in which odds are chosen
strategically against bettors. When either the bookie or the bettors are not standard expected
utility maximizers (in the 2002 paper, bettors also do not share a common prior), Border and Segal
show that strategic equilibrium behavior by a bookie may lead to betting rates that violate basic
laws of probability theory. These papers relate to the recent class of models studying two-sided
markets in which ￿rms interact with consumers who may have a variety of psychological biases.4
Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2004) consider evolution as the force restraining preferences.
They demonstrate that in almost every two-player continuous-action normal-form game, almost
every distortion of a player’s perceived payo￿s (that shifts the player away from standard payo￿-
maximization) will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payo￿-monotonic se-
lection dynamics.
Our impossibility theorem is related to an experimental result in Kluger and Wyatt (2004).
They use the Monty Hall problem to induce probability judgement errors in subjects and ￿nd that
competition among two error-free agents is su￿cient to make market prices bias-free.
Kocherlakota (2001) shows that competitive market outcomes do not generally identify dynam-
ically inconsistent time preferences { dynamic arbitrage disables prices of retradable assets from
revealing whether underlying preferences are time consistent or not. However, the prices of com-
mitment assets can identify time inconsistent preferences. These results are related to the general
identi￿cation result we present in Section 6. In addition, we provide some ways of identifying time
inconsistency, even when there is no commitment asset.
A similar conceptual question to the one posed in our paper pertains to the plausible beliefs
agents can hold in stochastic general equilibrium. Blume and Easley (1992, 2004) and Sandroni
(2000) analyze restrictions on agents’ behavioral rules as well as market incompleteness that lead
participants with inaccurate predictions to be driven out of a competitive market. In a related
3See also Cubitt and Sugden (2001).
4For instance, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and Spiegler (2006).
5spirit, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2007) illustrate the bounds of exploitation of agents who have
boundedly rational learning.
Finally, our analysis relies on the general equilibrium existence proof in Luttmer and Marriotti
(2003, 2006).
The source of the term Dutch Book remains unclear (Wakker (2001)). The term may have
been used to describe 19th century Dutch trading companies that hedged shipping risks so that
pro￿ts were made whether or not a ship survived the journey. Alternatively, the term may
have originated with derisive English expressions adopted during the 17th century rivalry between
Holland and England, such as Dutch courage and Dutch treat. Yet another possibility is that the
term was coined on the horse track, where it is still commonly used.
3 Motivating Example
In this section we present a simple example that illustrates and motivates some of our ￿ndings. We
￿rst consider a case that reproduces classical Dutch Book results and then show why these results
vanish in a market context.
3.1 A Dutch Book
Consider an agent who we will refer to as \Naif." Naif has the following time-inconsistent prefer-
ences over time-dated consumption, t 2 f1;2;3g:5









Naif believes (incorrectly) that his preferences in period 2 are dynamically consistent with his
preferences in period 1, so Naif believes that U2 = lnc2 + lnc3:
5Strotz (1957), Phelps and Pollak (1968), Akerlof (1991), Laibson (1997), and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
6Suppose that Naif has a consumption endowment of
(c1;c2;c3) = (3; 2; 1):
A second party | call him \Arbitrageur" | o￿ers Naif the opportunity to trade Naif’s original



















































2; and period 2 begins. Now Arbitrageur returns
















: Naif accepts. From



























































| is pointwise strictly dominated by Naif’s initial sequence
of claims: (3; 2; 1):
This is a classic example of a Dutch Book. A sequence of trades has strictly reduced Naif’s
endowment. The numbers in this example may seem unnecessarily complicated, but they are
carefully chosen to re￿ect the unique equilibrium trades that would arise if Arbitrageur was a
perfectly rational monopolist. The next subsection provides the relevant formalization.
3.2 Game-theoretic formalization
The previous example may leave one wondering about the details of the game being played. To
￿ll in those details, we embed the analysis in a formal game.






7Assume also that Arbitrageur has an arbitrary endowment.
At the beginning of every period Arbitrageur is allowed to make a single take-it-or-leave-it o￿er
to Naif. The rules of the game and the preferences of the agents are common knowledge, except for
the fact that Naif is mistaken in her forecasts of her own future preferences.6 One can show that
all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are characterized by the sequence of trades that we have
described above. These trades are constructed by sequentially o￿ering Naif the least costly bundle
{ as judged by Arbitrageur { that is at least as good to Naif as the bundle that Naif currently
holds.
3.3 Markets
Consider now a market economy composed of Naifs with the endowment (c1;c2;c3) and at least
two Arbitrageurs.7 Assume that instead of take-it-or-leave-it o￿ers, all exchange occurs in spot
markets and futures markets that open in every period of the economy. Also, assume that agents
may freely dispose of their goods if they prefer not to sell them in the market (this will be de￿ned
formally for general dynamic economies in Section 4 that follows).
As usual, an equilibrium is a sequence of prices and actions such that all markets clear and all
agents maximize their perceived interests, given their beliefs (regarding both prices and individual
future choice policies). In this economy it is easy to show that there exists a unique equilibrium
consumption sequence for Naifs:
c￿
1 =


















ct; so that a Dutch Book does not exist. In other words, agents do
not engage in trade (or free disposal) that leads to a consumption sequence that is dominated by
6Naif believes that Arbitrageur shares Naif’s beliefs about the future.
7This is a special case of the general class of markets that we study in this paper.
8their endowment. When Arbitrageurs have to compete with one another, they can no longer turn
individuals into money pumps.
In this example, the agents in the economy | both Naifs and Arbitrageurs | have non-generic
preferences. The crux of the ￿rst part of this paper is showing that this example generalizes
to a wide class of preferences. Within that class of preferences (namely, time separable and
weakly increasing), time inconsistent preferences and associated beliefs do not admit Dutch Books
in general equilibrium. However, markets are not panacea. We will also identify preferences for
which Dutch Books arise even in a competitive market equilibrium. In the second part of the paper
we identify the testable implications of time consistent models.
4 The Environment
We analyze an exchange economy in which agents trade goods in competitive markets. These agents
need not have dynamically consistent preferences or rational expectations. Although all trade takes
place in a competitive market, we also allow free disposal. The environment is deterministic in the
sense that endowments in every period are ￿xed at the beginning of time.
Most of our assumptions are made without loss of generality. For example, adding risk would
not change our results but would signi￿cantly complicate our notation. In section 7, we discuss
such generalizations.
4.1 Goods
We consider an exchange economy with a single consumption good at every date t = 1;:::;T: The
goods will be represented by the vector fc1;c2;:::;cTg: There are I types of consumers, indexed
by i = 1;:::;I: For every discrete consumer type there is a continuum of individual consumers.
Without loss of generality, we assume a unit measure of each type.8
At each period t, the date-t consumer decides how much to consume today and trades future
claims to consumption. The action of the date-t consumer is denoted by a vector Ct 2 Ct ￿RT
+;
where Ct re￿ects three types of consumption: past consumption (which is already ￿xed by date t),
8Heterogeneity in the quantity of di￿erent types can be captured by allocating some types more than one i index.
9current consumption, and claims to future consumption. More formally, we decompose the action
vector Ct into past consumption, fct
1;ct
2;:::;ct
t￿1g; current consumption, ct
t; and claims at date t
to future consumption, fct
t+1;ct
t+2;:::;ct
Tg: For notational convenience, we let ct ￿ ct
t: Hence, ct
refers to the actual consumption that takes place in period t:
For all s > t; denote by pt
s prices of futures contracts traded at time t for consumption at time
s. To simplify notation let pt ￿ pt
t, where pt
t is the spot price for consumption at date t. Finally,
let Pt = (p1;:::;pt￿1;pt
t;pt
t+1;:::;pt
T); which is the vector of past, current and future prices at date
t: All upper-case price vectors have T cells to facilitate vector operations.
At any period t; given the price vector Pt; the agent’s action set Ct is determined according to
her past history of actions, her current budget constraint, and a requirement that she can repay
her obligations after current consumption takes place.
Ct =
(
Ct 2 [￿ ￿ C;1)T j ct
s = cs


















Here ￿ C is a bound on consumption claims, which is imposed for technical reasons (see our existence
proof). Our main results will be applicable to cases in which ￿ C is arbitrarily large. The ￿rst
weak inequality in the expression above is the budget constraint. The second weak inequality is
a solvency constraint { agents cannot consume so much at time t that they leave themselves with
negative residual wealth starting at t + 1.
Note that Ct is a compact, convex set, which is a complete separable metric space as long as Ct is
non-empty. If Ct is empty, then the agent declares bankruptcy, exits the economy, and distributes
her claims among her creditors on a prorated basis. Given our assumptions, such bankruptcies can
only occur if the date-contingent price of a good moves over time. We let C0 = (c0
1;:::;c0
T) denote
the initial endowment at the outset of the game.
4.2 Preferences and Beliefs
A consumer type is de￿ned by an endowment vector C0
i 2 RT
++, a vector of continuous von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions (Ui;1;:::;Ui;T), and a belief system.
10We make the following assumptions on agents’ preferences and beliefs. These assumptions
apply to all types i and dates t.







i;s : R+ ! R is continuous, monotonically increasing, and strictly concave for all s.








i;s : R+ ! R is continuous, monotonically increasing, and strictly concave. Self t
believes that this speci￿cation is common knowledge among all future selves.9
A3 Each agent has either rational price expectations, Ei;tps
s0 = ps
s0 8t 6 s 6 s0; or passive price
expectations, Ei;tps
s0 = pt
s0 8t 6 s 6 s0: A positive mass of consumers have rational price
expectations.
The standard general equilibrium framework assumes that agents all have rational price expec-
tations. A3 relaxes that standard assumption by allowing (but not requiring) that some agents
have passive price expectations. If an agent has passive price expectations, then she assumes that
future prices are equal to prices in the current futures market { recall that pt
s0 is the price at date
t of consumption at date s0 > t. Hence, an agent with passive price expectations uses prices in the
futures market to form her beliefs about prices at future dates. Such reliance may arise because
of cognitive short-cuts or a recognition that markets aggregate information/insights that the agent
may not have on her own. Our analysis admits \mixed" economies in which some types have
rational price expectations and other types have passive price expectations.
9All of our results carry through if we allow agents to have a generalized hierarchy of beliefs about future preferences
and beliefs about future beliefs about preferences. For example, agent t could have beliefs about the preferences
of agent t + 2 that di￿er from agent t
0s beliefs about agent t + 1’s beliefs about the preferences of agent t + 2: For
presentational simplicity, we do not introduce the notation that would be necessary to characterize hierarchies of
arbitrary complexity, and instead only admit the \￿rst-order" hierarchies in A2.
11Assumptions A1 ￿ A3 will be in force throughout the paper unless otherwise noted. We
will occasionally refer to an agent as non-standard, if she is characterized by time inconsistent
preferences, inaccurate beliefs about her own future behavior, or passive price expectations (or any
combination of these properties).
We now discuss two examples of dynamically inconsistent preferences that illustrate our as-
sumptions.
Example 1 Non-transitive preferences. Consider a sequence fUtg such that:













￿(c1;c2;c3;:::;cT) = U￿(c1;c2;c3;:::;cT) for all ￿ > t: If v and u are monotonic, strictly
concave functions, and v is separable, then the sequences fUtg and f^ Ut
￿g satisfy A1 and A2: Let <t
represent the binary preference relation implied by Ut. The consumer in this example will exhibit
the following dynamic non-transitivity.
fc1;c2;c3;1;0;0;c7;:::;cTg ￿ 1 fc1;c2;c3;0;1;0;c7;:::;cTg
￿ 2 fc1;c2;c3;0;0;1;c7;:::;cTg
￿ 3 fc1;c2;c3;1;0;0;c7;:::;cTg:
Example 2 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak (1968), Laibson (1997)). Consider:




where 0 < ￿ 6 1; 0 < ￿ 6 1; and for all ￿ > t;
^ Ut




where ￿ 6 ^ ￿ 6 1: These speci￿cations satisfy A1 and A2. In the standard terminology (see
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000)), when ￿ = ^ ￿ the agents are sophisticated. When ￿ < ^ ￿ < 1 the
agents are partially naive. When ￿ < ^ ￿ = 1; the agents are completely naive.
124.3 Dynamic General Equilibrium
We ￿rst describe an individual consumer’s dynamic decision process assuming that current and
future spot prices are known (in a fashion reminiscent of Harris (1985) and Luttmer and Mariotti
(2006)). We then embed our consumers in a general equilibrium framework that endogenizes prices.
Finally, we present an equilibrium existence theorem that is closely based on the existence theorem
of Luttmer and Mariotti. We also characterize prices in equilibrium. We show that futures prices
are accurate when a positive measure of agents have rational expectations as prescribed by A3.
4.3.1 The Individual’s Maximization Problem: An Intrapersonal Game
In this subsection we present a brief analysis of an individual consumer’s equilibrium behavior. For
notational simplicity, we suppress the type index throughout.
Denote by H0 the set of potential initial endowments for our consumer.
The set of actions available to the date-t consumer at each date t = 1;:::;T is a set of potential
claim vectors, denoted by Ct; determined via her budget constraint (see Section 4.2). The set Ct
is a non-empty complete separable metric space.
A closed subset Ht ￿ H0￿
Qt
s=1 Cs encompasses the set of possible histories up to and including
date t: Following any history in Ht￿1; the set of actions available to the date-t consumer is given
by a correspondence At : Ht￿1 ! Ct that is continuous and has non-empty and compact values.
The set of possible histories are de￿ned in a recursive fashion by Ht = graph At for all t = 1;:::;T:
For any history ht￿1 2 Ht￿1; let ￿t(ht￿1) be the set of possible continuation histories following
history ht￿1: It follows that ￿t : Ht￿1 !
Qt
s=1 Cs is a continuous correspondence with non-empty
and compact values.
We will assume that the mixed strategy chosen by the date-t consumer, and not only the
outcome of such a mixed strategy, can be observed by her successors. This assumption is not
necessary for any of our qualitative results, but makes the exposition easier. This assumption is
common in the literature on intrapersonal games (see, e.g., Harris (1985)). In order to consider
observable mixed actions, we de￿ne extended histories as follows. For any t = 1;:::;T; the set of
13date-t extended histories ~ Ht is a closed set given by:
~ Ht =
(






That is, a date-t extended history is comprised of a history ht as well as a sequence ￿t of sequentially
feasible mixed strategies up to and including date t: For completeness, we set ~ H0 = H0 and interpret
￿0 as an empty symbol. We can now de￿ne strategies.
De￿nition 1 For any t = 1;:::;T; a strategy for the date-t consumer is a Borel measurable function
￿t : ~ Ht￿1 ! ￿(Ct) that satis￿es
supp￿t(￿ j ~ ht￿1) ￿ At(projHt￿1
~ ht￿1)
for all ~ ht￿1 2 ~ Ht￿1:
Equilibrium choices of individuals are time-dated (and possibly mixed) strategies that are op-
timal at each node of the game.




trapersonal equilibrium is a strategy combination ￿ such that for all t = 1;:::;T; and any history
~ ht￿1 2 ~ Ht￿1; the date-t consumer cannot strictly increase her perceived date-t utility in the subgame
~ ht￿1 by using a strategy other than ￿t:
Intrapersonal equilibria are subgame perfect: strategies are perceived to be optimal at each
node of the game, including nodes that are not reached with positive probability in equilibrium.
In an intrapersonal equilibrium, expectations are based on perceived utilities, re￿ecting possible
mistakes in beliefs about future utility functions (cf assumption A2) and mistakes in beliefs about
future prices (cf assumption A3).
Harris (1985) ensures the existence of an intrapersonal equilibrium in our setting.
4.3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
We use the following terminology:
14De￿nition 3 For all (x1;x2;:::;xt);(y1;y2;:::;yt) 2 Rt; we say (x1;x2;:::;xt) weakly dominates
(y1;y2;:::;yt) if xi > yi for all i: When a vector x weakly dominates a vector y we write x > y:
We say (x1;x2;:::;xt) strongly dominates (y1;y2;:::;yt) if xi > yi for all i; with at least one strict
inequality. When a vector x strongly dominates a vector y we write x > y:
Our exchange economy is said to be in equilibrium if all consumers are following equilibrium
strategies, and all markets clear. Formally,
De￿nition 4 (Dynamic General Equilibrium) A dynamic general equilibrium of the economy












(i) All agents choose (intrapersonal) equilibrium strategies at all dates.







Our ￿rst theorem implies that our environment possesses a dynamic general equilibrium.
Theorem 1 There exists a competitive equilibrium in which consumers of the same type follow the
same strategies.10
The proof follows the lines of the existence proof presented by Luttmer and Mariotti (2006).
Our setting di￿ers because we allow for free disposal, passive price expectations, and perceived
preferences of future selves that do not match actual preferences of future selves. Since free
disposal does not alter the topological attributes of the action sets, this weakening in itself does not
complicate the argument. Passive price expectations and inaccurate perceived future preferences
enter the calculations needed to compute the backward induction process consumers use to choose
their actions at each stage. Our assumption A2 assures that demands remain well-behaved.
10This theorem relies on the assumption that agents observe their own past mixed actions. Dropping this
observability assumption would not sabotage existence, but would potentially eliminate symmetric equilibria.
15For the sake of completeness, we include a detailed description of the appropriately modi￿ed
proof in Appendix A. We show that the intrapersonal equilibrium paths of this game are well-
behaved. Speci￿cally, these paths take non-empty convex and compact values and have closed and
bounded graphs (upper hemicontinuous). These attributes carry, in turn, to the excess demand
function, which is the crucial object for the analysis of equilibrium existence here. In fact, De-
breu (1982) drew a connection between existence and the limit values well-behaved excess demand
functions take at the boundary of the potential price set. Namely, one needs to show that excess
demand explodes as one or more prices reach the boundary. Our assumptions A1 and A2 ensure
this is indeed the case.
4.4 Equilibrium Dutch Booking
The presence of a Dutch Book is checked by comparing successive pro￿les of consumption claims.
In rough terms, the economy admits money losing Dutch Books if there exists a type i that executes
a sequence of equilibrium trades that leaves her with a strictly dominated pro￿le of claims. Our
assumptions on the agent’s utility functions imply such domination will indeed leave the agent
weakly worse o￿ at any date, and strictly worse o￿ in at least one period (compared to the autarkic
consumption path).
De￿nition 5 An economy exhibits money losing Dutch Books if there exists an agent type i and
a sequence of equilibrium vectors fCt(i)gT
t=0 such that
Ct(i) > Ct+s(i);
for some s > 0:
Analogously, the economy admits money making Dutch Books if there exists a type i that
executes a sequence of equilibrium trades that leaves her with a strictly dominant pro￿le of claims.
De￿nition 6 An economy exhibits money making Dutch Books if there exists an agent type i and
a sequence of equilibrium vectors fCt(i)gT
t=0 such that
Ct(i) < Ct+s(i);
16for some s > 0:
We will show that neither type of Dutch Book is possible in our environment.
Another natural de￿nition for Dutch Books would be based on agents’ wealth. Namely, a money
losing Dutch Book could be de￿ned as a situation where a sequence of trades leaves the agent with
less consumed and residual wealth than the amount of wealth with which she started. A money
making Dutch Book would be de￿ned analogously. Our de￿nition is technically more restrictive.
We choose De￿nitions 5 and 6 for two reasons. First, given our assumptions on preferences, lower
wealth may not strictly reduce equilibrium welfare (see examples below). In contrast, a dominated
sequence of claims always leaves the player strictly worse o￿ relative to autarky. Second, choosing
a wealth-based de￿nition does not alter the impossibility results as will be seen in Section 5.
5 Impossibility of Dutch Books
Our impossibility theorem, Theorem 2, shows that as long as there is a positive measure of agents
with rational price expectations, neither money losing Dutch Books nor money making Dutch Books
can be features of the dynamic general equilibrium.
Our proof follows two simple Lemmas (whose full proofs appear in Appendix B). We start by
showing that equilibrium futures prices must be positive and equal to their associated future spot
prices. The proof is based on a standard no-arbitrage argument. We then show that Walras’
law holds for all agents at each point in time. The combination of these claims leads to our
impossibility theorem.
Indeed, Assumption A2 guarantees that any su￿ciently large increase in future wealth will
increase perceived current utility. Thus, if prices are not rational these agents can arbitrage the
market, predicting that upon a su￿cient increase of future wealth, future behavior will assure an
increase in all future consumption levels. Formally,
Lemma 1 For su￿ciently large ￿ C; all equilibrium futures prices satisfy rational expectations and
are strictly positive.
17Our second Lemma essentially illustrates the fact that Walras’ law holds in the economy. That
is, agents do not freely dispose of wealth in the economy. As we show in the robustness section
below, the crucial assumption for this result is the separability of preferences. All agents would
strictly prefer to consume more in the present { increasing current instantaneous utility and not
a￿ecting future utility { rather than throwing away wealth. Speci￿cally, we have:
Lemma 2 (Walras’ Law) For su￿ciently large ￿ C; equilibrium prices and allocations satisfy PT ￿
Cs = PT ￿ Ct for all agents and all s;t = 1;:::;T:
Our main result follows. The existence of any Dutch Book implies that wealth is gained or lost
at some point in the sequence of trades. But, this violates Walras’ Law. Hence, as long as the
cap on individual sales ￿ C is large, the exchange economy is free of Dutch Books.
Theorem 2 (Impossibility of Dutch Books) For su￿ciently large ￿ C > 0; there is no money
losing or money making Dutch Book.
Proof : Assume that a money losing Dutch Book did exist. Then, for some agent (suppressing
her index), Cs > Ct; where s < t: Consider any T-length vector, x >> 0: It follows that
x ￿ Cs > x ￿ Ct: However, for su￿ciently large ￿ C; Lemma 1 implies that PT >> 0 while Lemma 2
implies that PT ￿ Cs = PT ￿ Ct. Hence, we have a contradiction.
Similarly, assume that a money making Dutch Book existed. Then, for some agent (suppressing
her index), Cs < Ct; where s < t: Consider any T-length vector, x >> 0: It follows that x ￿ Cs <
x ￿ Ct: As before, for su￿ciently large ￿ C; the Lemmas above imply that PT ￿ Cs = PT ￿ Ct while
PT >> 0; which leads to a contradiction. ￿
The theorem implies that in general equilibrium, non-standard agents do not engender Dutch
Books.
We next pursue two separate directions. In Section 6 we ask whether market mechanisms
restrain prices and demands in ways that would enable an outside observer to detect agents with
time inconsistent preferences or inaccurate beliefs about future behavior. In Section 7 we provide
robustness analysis for our results.
186 Identi￿cation of Non-standard Preferences
Our impossibility theorem establishes that consumers in competitive markets will not be Dutch
Booked if they have preferences/beliefs that satisfy assumptions A1￿A3. These assumptions admit
dynamically inconsistent preferences and inaccurate beliefs about future preferences. We now ask
whether the existence of such consumers would a￿ect empirically measurable market transactions.
Speci￿cally, we identify price and quantity pro￿les that are consistent with the standard model |
i.e., dynamically consistent preferences and rational expectations | and those that are not.
We start by showing that essentially any quantities and (strictly positive) prices can be explained
with a general equilibrium model of a heterogeneous population comprised of dynamically consistent
agents with preferences satisfying assumption A1 and rational expectations.
Theorem 3 For any P >> 0; and demand correspondences fct(i)gI
i=1; there are time-consistent
utilities fUitgI
i=1 satisfying A1 such that there exists a general equilibrium of the economy, comprised
of agents with utilities fUitgI
i=1 and rational price expectations, generating the observed prices and
demands.
Proof: Let P >> 0 and assume fct(i)gI
i=1 is the consumption pro￿le observed in the economy.




(c ￿ ct(i))2; t = 1;:::;T:
Then Ui;t(c1;:::;cT) =
PT
s=1 ui;s(cs); for all t; satis￿es assumption A1 (with strict concavity of ui;t(c)
for all i;t). Furthermore, a deviation constituting ￿ > 0 less consumption units at time s for the
bene￿t of an additional
ps
pt￿ units at time t leads to a loss of ps￿ at time s and a gain of pt
ps
pt￿ = ps￿
at time t: In particular, (P;fct(i)gI
i=1) would indeed constitute a dynamic general equilibrium of the
economy with time consistent consumers identi￿ed by preferences fUi;t(c1;:::;cT)gi;t and rational
price expectations.11 ￿
11In fact, we could take ui;t(c) = ptc for all i and t and still arrive at the result, but ui;t would be only weakly
concave.
19Thus, generically, non-standard agents cannot be identi￿ed by observing only one arbitrary se-
quence of quantities and strictly positive prices. We note that observations of the entire dynamics
of the game, i.e., the timed pro￿les of claims fCt(i)gI
i=1 rather than the stream of \spot" consump-
tion, does not qualitatively change the result, as long as a dynamic Walras law holds. That is,









for all t and i; the results of Theorem 3 carry through.
While the identi￿cation analysis thus far makes the point that any data set can be generated
with a model using time consistent preferences, it has little to say about the consistency of these
induced models across data sets. For example, a model that matches the data for the observed
behavior in the economy in a setting in which agents have one set of endowments may not provide a
good ￿t for the data generated in the same economy endowed with a di￿erent pro￿le of endowments.
Put another way, restricting the set of acceptable models to ones that explain behavior under one
set of fundamentals (i.e., endowments) provides too many degrees of freedom and would generate a
class of models, some of which will have very little predictive power in environments with di￿erent
fundamentals.
In the remainder of the section, we put more restrictions on observed behavior. We now
look across n di￿erent environments that are characterized by di￿erent endowments. As in static
demand theory, a crucial consistency requirement is that if one pro￿le of consumption C1 is chosen
in one environment when another pro￿le C2 is a￿ordable (i.e., it is revealed preferred), then in any
environment in which C2 is chosen, it should be the case that C1 is not a￿ordable. This is the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preferences. In static, multiple good environments, Afriat (1967) proved that a
stronger condition is necessary and su￿cient to explain a ￿nite data set with a locally non-satiated
concave utility model.12 Viewing each timed good in our setup as a di￿erent good, we can apply
Afriat’s Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference as follows. Assume that an economist has data from
n di￿erent economies, including both price and consumption sequences: fPj;fCj(i)gI
i=1gn
j=1.
12For two new proofs of Afriat’s Theorem see Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004).
20De￿nition 7 (Dynamic Axiom of Revealed Preferences) The data set fPj;fCj(i)gI
i=1gn
j=1
satis￿es the Dynamic Axiom of Revealed Preferences (DARP) if for all i, for any fj1;:::;jkg ￿
f1;:::;ng such that
Pjl ￿ Cjl+1(i) 6 Pjl ￿ Cjl(i); l = 1;:::;k ￿ 1;
then Pjk ￿ Cj1(i) > Pjk ￿ Cjk(i):
The Dynamic Axiom of Revealed Preferences, henceforth DARP, is certainly a necessary con-
dition for the existence of a time-consistent model that generates the observable data.
Thinking about consumption in each period as a di￿erent good, the existence of a well-behaved
utility function of the form U(c1;:::;cT) that generates the observed data guarantees a time consis-
tent well-behaved model that generates the data. Indeed, de￿ne the time t utility by Ut(c1;:::;cT) =
U(c1;:::;cT) for all t: We can thus use Afriat’s theorem to provide necessary and su￿cient condi-
tions for the existence of a time consistent, piecewise linear, strictly monotonic, and concave model
that generates the data.
Theorem 4 (Afriat’s Theorem) The observed data set fPj;fCj(i)gI
i=1gn
j=1 satis￿es DARP if
and only if there exist a collection of I time consistent, piecewise linear, strictly monotonic, and
concave utilities that generate the observed data.
Note that while Theorem 4 provides necessary and su￿cient conditions for a time consistent
model, it does not provide conditions for the time separability assumed in A1 and A2:13
Stationary Exponential Preferences
The ￿rst part of this section analyzed preferences that are time-separable, monotonic, strictly
concave, and dynamically consistent. We now consider a much more restrictive class of dynamic
preferences.
13When observing only aggregate consumption data, but all individual endowments, Kubler (2003) illustrated that
a slight relaxation of time separability yields practically no restrictions on observables.
21De￿nition 8 (Stationary Exponential Preferences) A stationary, time-separable exponential





for all t; where u : R+ ! R is continuous, monotonically increasing, and concave. Furthermore,
0 < ￿ 6 1:
Stationary exponential preferences have a time-invariant felicity function and discount felicities
exponentially. As a consequence of these assumptions, stationary exponential preferences are
dynamically consistent. Stationary exponential preferences imply that demand tracks prices in the
following sense.
De￿nition 9 (Discounted Monotonic Demand) For any price vector P; we say the pro￿le
fct(i)gI
i=1 exhibits discounted monotonic demand if for all i; there exists ￿i 2 (0;1]; such that for
all s;t = 1;:::;T;
pt
ps￿t￿s
i > 1 , cs(i) > ct(i):
Clearly, a dynamic equilibrium of an economy comprised of consumers with stationary ex-
ponential preferences with rational price expectations will satisfy discounted monotonic demand.
Moreover, if an economy satis￿es discounted monotonic demand, then there exist stationary expo-
nential preferences that would generate those demand pro￿les:
Theorem 5 Demand pro￿le fct(i)gI
i=1 exhibits discounted monotonic demand if and only if there
exists a set of consumers with stationary exponential preferences that would reproduce the economy’s
equilibrium.
The su￿ciency part of the theorem’s proof is constructive, and appears in Appendix B. We
use parameters f￿ig that correspond to the discounted monotonic demand condition and construct
a piecewise linear utility function that assures that forgoing an amount ￿ > 0 in any period s
generates a loss in utility terms that is identical to the potential utility gain of shifting ￿ to any
other period’s consumption. Namely, forgoing ￿ > 0 in any period s translates into a loss of
22ps￿ in utility terms. ￿ can then be transformed into
ps
pt￿ wealth units in any other period t;
which translates into pt
ps
pt￿ = ps￿ in utility terms. The observed demand pro￿le is then part of
an equilibrium.
7 Robustness
We have made several assumptions that limit the scope of our analysis. In the current section we
discuss those assumptions and explain which of them can be relaxed without a￿ecting our results.
Our discussion covers separability of preferences, transaction costs, and risk.
7.1 Separability of preferences
Our analysis relies on the assumption that preferences (actual and perceived) are separable over
time, as assured by A1 and A2. In this subsection, we illustrate why our impossibility result cannot
be extended generically to economies populated by agents with non-separable preferences.
Consider an economy comprised of agents with the following dynamically inconsistent prefer-
ences14
U1 = c3
U2 = ln(c1 + ￿c2 + c3) + c2
U3 = c3
where ￿ 2 (0;1): As we will show below, self 1 and self 2 generally disagree about how much of
the endowment to spend on c2: But this disagreement vanishes when self 2 has su￿ciently little
wealth. At low levels of wealth, self 2 wants to spend all wealth on c3. When wealth rises above
a key threshold, c3 becomes an inferior good for self 2. Consequently, there is an incentive for self
1 to partially impoverish self 2, thereby leading self 2 to cut consumption of c2 and implicitly raise
consumption of c3.




14These analytically tractable preferences do not satisfy our regularity assumptions | e.g., strict concavity | but
the example would go through if we perturbed the preferences so that they did satisfy all of our regularity conditions.
23We now show that there exists an equilibrium that exhibits money losing Dutch Books, and
which has pt
s = 1 for all s;t. Assume that all spot and future prices are equal to 1 and denote each






To solve for the interpersonal equilibrium choices, consider the decision of self 2. With wealth





0 if 0 6 W0 < 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1
1
1￿￿ (W0 ￿ 1 + ￿ + c1) if 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1 6 W0 < 1
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1)
W0 if 1
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1) 6 W0
:





W0 if 0 6 W0 < 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1
1
1￿￿ (￿￿W0 + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1) if 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1 6 W0 < 1
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1)
0 if 1
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ c1) 6 W0
:
Note that c3 is falling in W0 and falling in c1: From the perspective of self 1, the optimal policy
would be to set c1 = 0 and W0 = 1￿￿: So if W > 1￿￿; the equilibrium path of the game will be
c1 = 0
c2 = 0
c3 = 1 ￿ ￿:
Note that the market clearing condition holds as long as W > 1 ￿ ￿, so that the above demand
pro￿le is indeed part of an equilibrium for all W > 1 ￿ ￿. Furthermore, if W > 1 ￿ ￿ self 1 of
each agent engages in free disposal. Self 1 would rather freely dispose of her wealth, than pass it
along to self 2 or spend it on c1: In this sense, self 1 can be Dutch Booked. She would rather give
wealth away, than sell it (regardless of how high the price).
This counterexample is very fragile. We now break the example by introducing a second good
| b c1 | in period 1. Preferences are now
U1 = b c1 + c3
U2 = ln(c1 + ￿c2 + c3) + c2
U3 = c3:
24In this case, the Dutch Book vanishes, the period 1 incarnation of each agent in the economy will
take whatever wealth she would have previously discarded, and instead use that wealth to consume
b c1:
These two examples demonstrate that our impossibility result does not depend on complete
time separability of preferences. Rather our impossibility result is implied by the existence of at
least one good that is time separable.
7.2 Transaction costs
Our analysis assumes that exchange takes place without any transaction costs. If we introduce
such transaction costs our results will change, but only if agents do not have accurate beliefs about
their own future preferences.
For example, consider an economy comprised of agents of two types. Each type constitutes
half of the population. Type i = 1 agents share the following preferences:15
U1;1 = c3 + lnc2
U1;2 = lnc3
U1;3 = lnc3
Type 1 agents are endowed with consumption claims (c1;c2;c3) = (0;0;1): In period t = 1, agents
of type 1 want to shift at least part of their consumption from period t = 3 to period t = 2 (since
limc!0
d lnc
dc = 1): But this preference is only transitory (vanishing in period t = 2):
Type i = 2 agents share the following preferences:
U2;1 = c2 + lnc3
U2;2 = lnc2
U2;3 = lnc2
Type 2 agents are endowed with consumption claims (c1;c2;c3) = (0;1;0): In period t = 1, agents
15Again, the analytically tractable utility speci￿cation could be perturbed to satisfy our regularity assumptions.
25of type 2 want to shift at least part of their consumption from period t = 2 to period t = 3: But
this preference is also only transitory (vanishing in period t = 2):
Assume all agents are naive, so they do not anticipate their dynamically inconsistent preferences.
Hence, b Ut
i;￿ = Ui;t for all i;t;￿:16
Assume that agents face proportional transaction costs. At each period, any claims of market
value w can be traded for claims of value (1 ￿ ￿)w; where ￿ 2 (0;1): For the purposes of this
example, we assume that this transaction cost is real: a portion ￿ of the goods and claims being
traded is destroyed during the transfer.
It is straightforward to see that all equilibria imply that pt
2 = pt
3 for all t (pt
1 is arbitrary since
agents never value c1): Furthermore, there exists an equilibrium in which agents of type 1 end up
with a claim vector of (0;0;(1 ￿ ￿)2) < (0;0;1) in periods 2 and 3; while agents of type 2 end up
with a claim vector of (0;(1￿￿)2;0) < (0;1;0): In particular, there is a money losing Dutch Book
in equilibrium.17
At the other extreme, if we assume all agents are perfectly forward looking, so that b Ut
i;￿ = Ui;￿
for all i;t;￿;there exists a unique equilibrium that involves no trade and no Dutch Book.
This example illustrates two points. First, if consumers are naive and transaction costs exist,
then agents may get Dutch Booked | a \money losing Dutch Book." Second, if consumers antici-
pate their future preferences accurately, no Dutch Book occurs. The following Proposition, proven
in Appendix B, establishes the second point generally.
Proposition (Impossibility - Transaction Costs) Consider an economy in which transaction
costs are proportional at each period t and are de￿ned by the fraction ￿t 2 (0;1); t = 1;:::;T.
If all agents hold accurate beliefs about their own future preferences, so that b Ut
i;￿ = Ui;￿ for
all i;t;￿; then there are no Dutch Books in equilibrium.
In the absence of transaction costs, agents of any type were not losing wealth through equilibrium
trades. It is important to note that in the presence of transaction costs, wealth may in fact be lost
16We maintain A3, so a positive mass of agents have rational price expectations for the economy.
17There are many equilibria in this economy. Only one has no Dutch Books. In fact, in this equilibrium no trade
occurs at all.
26even by agents with accurate beliefs about future behavior. Indeed, such consumers may engage
in equilibrium trades leading them to lower overall wealth. However, markets put restrictions on
the patterns by which wealth can be lost. In particular, wealth cannot be lost in a way that makes
all incarnations of an agent worse o￿, thereby ruling out money losing Dutch Books.
7.3 Risk
Throughout the analysis we have only considered environments that are riskless. This assumption
is made for convenience. Analogous arguments rule out Dutch Books in risky economies. In a risky
economy a money making Dutch Book is a series of trades that improve one’s claims in every state
of nature.18 Likewise, a money losing Dutch Book is a series of trades that reduce one’s claims in
every state of nature.
The only problem that arises in such a risky framework is the challenge of restricting the contract
space so that agents are able to repay their equilibrium obligations.19 To resolve this problem, we
adopt the assumption that contracts can only be written if parties to the contract can repay in all
states of nature. With this assumption, an equilibrium will exist and the impossibility theorems
from the deterministic economy of the current paper extend one-for-one to the risky environment.
8 Conclusion
Competitive pressures protect non-standard agents { economic actors with dynamically inconsistent
preferences, or inaccurate beliefs about their own future behavior { from being exploited by a Dutch
Book. More generally, in equilibrium agents with non-standard preferences and beliefs will not
give up wealth without engaging in consumption of equal market value. Non-standard consumers
may still make bad choices (depending on the welfare function that is applied). They may consume
their wealth too early or too late, or consume the wrong bundle of static goods. Nevertheless,
whatever their equilibrium choices, they will not get Dutch Booked or tricked into losing wealth.
18The improvement needs to be strict in one state of nature.
19For example, if an agent is certain that it will, say, rain tomorrow, she will try to bet more than all of her wealth
on that state of nature. But, if she loses the bet, she cannot repay.
27Many of the preferences that were considered to be vulnerable to Dutch Books are not in fact
vulnerable once agents with those preferences are embedded in a competitive economic market.
However, the existence of non-standard consumers may nevertheless have identi￿able e￿ects
on market outcomes. If the Dynamic Axiom of Revealed Preferences does not hold, then a time
consistent model will not explain observed data.
289 Appendix A { Existence of Equilibria
For any initial h0 2 H0; a strategy pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿T) generates a probability distribution over
the set of potential histories in the subgame h0: We term this probability distribution as the path
induced by ￿ in the subgame h0:
Recall that ￿t+1(ht) denotes the set of all possible continuation histories following history ht:
Assume now that ￿t+1 : Ht ! ￿(￿t+1(￿)) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-
empty convex and compact values that describes intrapersonal equilibrium continuation paths
following any history in Ht:
We work backward in order to obtain continuation paths for histories in Ht￿1: We ￿rst need
to mesh continuation paths in ￿t+1(Ht) with mixed actions of the date-t consumer. We start by
specifying a sure superset of continuation paths following a history ht￿1 2 Ht￿1:
P￿t+1(ht￿1) = f￿ : ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿;￿ 2 ￿(At(ht￿1));￿(￿ j Ct) 2 ￿t+1(ht￿1;Ct)g:
This is the set of all probability distributions over ￿t(ht￿1) that are consistent with marginal distri-
butions in ￿(At(ht￿1)) and conditionals that map the t-dated claims pro￿le Ct into ￿t+1(ht￿1;Ct):
As in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006), we have the following:
Lemma 3 P￿t+1 : Ht￿1 ! ￿(￿t(￿)) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-empty
values that are convex and compact.




Ut(c1;:::;ct;z)d￿(z) j ￿ 2 ￿t+1(ht)
￿
:
denote by AWt(ht) the set of probabilities for which the minimum is attained. For any history
ht￿1 2 Ht￿1; the date-t consumer can guarantee an approximate utility level of:
Vt(ht￿1) = sup
￿
Wt(ht￿1;Ct) j Ct 2 At(ht￿1)
￿
:
29We can now de￿ne
G￿t+1(ht￿1) =
￿





Roughly speaking, G￿t+1(ht￿1) are all of the conceivable continuation paths that are individually
rational, in the sense of achieving a utility level of at least Vt(ht￿1): The convexity of P￿t+1(ht￿1)
implies that G￿t+1(ht￿1) is convex as well.
Lemma 4 Wt : Ht ! R and Vt : Ht￿1 ! R are lower semicontinuous. Moreover, G￿t+1 : Ht￿1 !
￿(￿t(￿)) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-empty values that are convex and
compact.
The proof is standard and makes use of Lemma 3.
For any correspondence F de￿ned on Ht; an extended Borel measurable selection from F is
a Borel measurable function f de￿ned on ~ Ht is for which f(~ ht) 2 F(projHt~ ht) for all ~ ht 2 ~ Ht:
Extended measurable selections exist if measurable selections exist.
Lemma 5 Suppose ￿t is an extended Borel measurable selection from G￿t+1: Then there exists
a Borel measurable function ￿t : ~ Ht￿1 ! ￿(Ct) and an extended Borel measurable selection ￿t+1
from ￿t+1 such that:
1. ￿t is optimal for the date-t consumer given the continuation ￿t+1;
2. ￿t(￿ j ~ ht￿1) =
R
￿t+1(￿ j ~ ht￿1;Ct;￿t(￿ j ~ ht￿1))d￿t(Ct j ~ ht￿1):
The proof follows that of Lemma 3 in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and is thereby omitted. We
do note, however, that the proof uses the observability of past mixed actions in the construction
of an equilibrium path. Indeed, the agent is not indi￿erent between actions in the support of
her strategy at each date, since she knows choosing one of them may lead to a punishment at
a later date if a mix was prescribed. As mentioned in the body of the paper, the observability
assumption is, in fact, not necessary for existence, but makes the proofs far simpler, and allows us
to concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
30We now use backward induction to deduce the consumer’s potential actions at each stage. At
date T; for any hT￿1 in HT￿1, de￿ne the maximizing actions by:
MT(hT￿1) = argmax
￿Z
UT(c1;:::;cT￿1;c)d￿(c) j ￿ 2 ￿(AT(hT￿1))
￿
:
Using the Maximum Theorem, MT(hT￿1) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-
empty, convex, and compact values.
Similarly, for all t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1; ^ Mt
T can be de￿ned to be the maximizing actions at time T









T is characterized by the same topological attributes of MT:
For all t; we can de￿ne recursively ^ Mt
s = G ^ Mt
s+1 for all s = t;:::;T ￿ 1:
De￿ne M1 = G ^ M1
2:
Lemma 6 The correspondence M1 : H0 ! ￿(￿1(￿)) is upper hemicontinuous with non-empty
values that are convex and compact. For every h0 2 H0; M1(h0) is the set of intrapersonal
equilibrium paths given initial condition h0:
The Lemma is essentially a replication of Proposition 1 in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) { the
proof is thus omitted.
Under the above assumptions, there exists an intrapersonal equilibrium in the intrapersonal
game corresponding to each type of consumer (see Harris (1985)). We denote by Mi;1(P) =
M1(P;C0) the set of intrapersonal equilibrium paths for a consumer of type i in the economy with
(rational) prices P and initial endowment of C0: From Lemma 6, Mi;1 is upper hemicontinuous
with non-empty convex and compact values.
Aiming at illustrating the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, assume that consumers of type i
all follow strategies that implement the same path ￿i(￿ j P) 2 Mi;1(P): The aggregate consumption
claim vector of type i is then
R
Cd￿i(C j P): De￿ne ￿i(P) : Mi;1(P) ! RT by
￿i(P)(￿i) =
Z
Cd￿i(C j P) ￿ C0
i :
31￿i(P) is a continuous mapping.
We de￿ne the excess demand correspondence as:
￿i(P) = Im￿i(P):
Upper hemicontinuity of Mi;1 implies the upper hemicontinuity of ￿i.





zi j zi 2 ￿i(P) for all i
)
:
Note that for each i; ￿i(P) is convex-valued since Mi;1 is convex-valued. In addition, it is bounded
below by ￿C0
i :
The strict monotonicity and separability of preferences combined with price rationality imply
that P ￿C = P ￿C0
i for all C in the support of some path ￿i(￿ j P) 2 Mi;1(P) (the proof follows the
lines of that of Lemma 2). Thus, for all z 2 ￿(P);





i )d￿i(C j P) = 0:
In particular, the aggregate excess demand ￿ satis￿es Walras’ law.
The proof of existence of a competitive equilibrium follows the lines of the proof in Luttmer in
Mariotti (2006), which is in itself based on a theorem in Debreu (1982). In essence, we need to
check that ￿ satis￿es the following boundary condition: if a sequence fPng in ￿T converges to a




We start by showing that the expected utility of the date-1 consumer goes to +1 uniformly
across intrapersonal equilibria as fPng converges to P 2 @￿T.
Lemma 7 For any (Ui;1;:::;Ui;T) satisfying A1 and A2, if a sequence fPng in ￿T converges to P 2
@￿T; then the expected utility of the date-1 consumer goes to +1 uniformly across intrapersonal
equilibria as fPng converges to P 2 @￿T.
Proof : We use induction on the length T. For T = 2; the date-1 consumer faces a standard
decision problem with strictly increasing utility indices and the expected utility of the date-1
consumer indeed goes to +1 as fPng approaches P 2 @￿T:
32Suppose that the result holds for any game of length T: We now con￿rm the claim for games of
length T +1: Suppose ￿rst that fPn
1 g approaches zero. Then the date-1 consumer can guarantee
a utility approaching +1 in the limit by spending her entire wealth on current consumption,
regardless of the behavior of her successors. This implies that the expected utility of the date-1
consumer must go to +1 uniformly across equilibria, as desired. Formally, for all sequences f￿n
i g
that satisfy ￿n





i (C) = +1:
Suppose alternatively that fPn
1 g is bounded away from zero and some other price goes to zero.
Assume, toward a contradiction, that there is a sequence of intrapersonal equilibria along which
expected date-1 utility remains bounded. Note that the induction hypothesis implies that along
this same sequence of intrapersonal equilibria the amount of nominal wealth left by date-1 consumer
to the date-2 consumer must go to zero. Indeed, if the date-1 consumer were to leave a positive
nominal wealth " > 0 to the date-2 consumer, then the induction hypothesis would imply that the
utility of the date-2 consumer would go to +1 uniformly across intrapersonal equilibria along the




















1 and leaving nominal wealth " > 0 to the date-2 consumer. But this implies
that the date-1 consumer could guarantee for herself in￿nite utility in the limit, in contradiction.￿
Let fPng in ￿T converge to a price in @￿T: Lemma 7 asserts that for all sequences f￿n
i g that
satisfy ￿n





i (C) = +1:
The concavity of u1






























i (C) = +1:
In particular, infe2￿i(P) kek goes to +1.
We can now apply Debreu (1982, Theorem 8) to obtain our desired existence result, Theorem
1.
3410 Appendix B { Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We start by showing that if in equilibrium for some 1 6 s 6 T; ps
t = ps0
t for
all t > s0 > s; then ps0
t > 0 for all t > s0 > s in that equilibrium. We use induction on the length
of the game starting at period s; T ￿ s + 1. Consider T = s: Since utility is increasing, prices
have to be strictly positive for A1 to hold. Suppose the claim holds for T ￿ s + 1 = ￿ ￿ 1 and
consider a situation in which T ￿ s + 1 = ￿: From the induction step, Ps+1;Ps+2;:::;PT >> 0:
From the rationality assumption, we only need to show that ps
s > 0: The strict monotonicity and
separability entailed by A1 as well as the perceived separability captured by A2; assure that this
is indeed the case.
Now, suppose prices are not rational in some equilibrium: Let s;1 6 s 6 T; be the last period for
which there exists t > s such that ps
t 6= ps+1
t : In particular, in the subgame starting at period s+1;
prices are rational and hence, using the above, are all strictly positive. Assume ￿rst that ps
t < ps+1
t :
Any agent can engage in riskless arbitrage by purchasing cs
t 6 ￿ C units of the t-timed good in period





Denote by (^ cs
s+k(wk);:::;^ cs
T(wk));k > 0; the expected consumption stream at time s, from time
s + k and on, when the wealth at the beginning of period s + 1 is wk. We now show that under
A2, for any wk;1 > wk;2 > 0; (^ cs
s+k(wk;1);:::;^ cs
T(wk;1)) > (^ cs
s+k(wk;2);:::;^ cs
T(wk;2)):
We use induction on the length of the remainder of the game, T ￿ s:
For T ￿ s = 1; the claim follows directly since utilities are strictly monotonic.
Assume the claim holds for T ￿s = ￿ ￿1 and consider the case of T ￿s = ￿: From the induction












Let w1;1 > w1;2: The optimality of (b cs
s+1(w1;2);:::;b cs










s+2(w1;2 ￿ x);:::;b cs




35From the strict concavity implied by A2; it follows that b cs






T(w1;1)) > (b cs
s+2(w1;2);:::;b cs
T(w1;2)): Similarly, strict concavity together with the
induction hypothesis imply that b cs
s+1(w1;1) < b cs
s+1(w1;2):
From strict monotonicity, agents will therefore choose cs
t = ￿ C: In particular, for su￿ciently
large ￿ C; markets will not clear.
A parallel argument holds for ps
t > ps+1
t :
Note that for any given endowment, for su￿ciently large ￿ C; any form of irrational expectations
(corresponding to any two periods) will lead to a violation of market clearing. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: Using Lemma 1 it su￿ces to show that for all t; Pt ￿Ct = Pt ￿Ct￿1: Indeed,
if for some t;t1 6 t 6 t2; Pt￿Ct < Pt￿Ct￿1 then the agent can deviate by purchasing Pt￿Ct￿1￿Pt￿Ct
Pt
t
units of the good to be consumed at time t, thereby strictly increasing her time t utility and not
a￿ecting her future allocations, in contradiction to condition (i) for a general equilibrium allocation.
￿
Proof of Theorem 5: Assume that fct(i)gI
i=1 exhibits discounted monotonic demand with
parameters f￿ig. For each i = 1;:::;I; let ￿i : f1;:::;Tg ! f1;:::;Tg be a permutation such
that c￿(1)(i) 6 c￿(2)(i) 6 ::: 6 c￿(T)(i): De￿ne:
ui(c) =
8
> > > > > > > > <


















































The monotonicity of demand assures that Ui;t(c1;:::;cT) =
PT
s=1 ￿s
iui(cs) satis￿es assumption A1.
Furthermore, forgoing an amount ￿ > 0 in period s; translating into ps￿ in utility terms, could
be transformed into
ps
pt￿ wealth units in any other period t; which translates into pt
ps
pt￿ = ps￿ in
utils. In particular, agents i are using equilibrium strategies when consuming pro￿les fct(i)gI
i=1:
The converse direction follows de￿nitionally.20 ￿
20Note that an analogous construction could be used had we considered the case ￿i > 1:
36Proof of Proposition (Impossibility - Transaction Costs): Similar arguments to those used
in Lemmas 1 and 2 assure that in any equilibrium, all prices are strictly positive. Assume that a
money losing Dutch Book did exist. Then, in some equilibrium, for some agent (suppressing her
index), Cs > Ct; where s < t: Given the equilibrium prices, if the agent were to start in period
s + 1 with a claim vector Ct; there would be an interpersonal equilibrium of the truncated game
starting at period s+1 specifying no trade between periods s and t: Indeed, otherwise there would
necessarily be a pro￿table deviation in the original game, in contradiction. Consider now the
following deviation at period s (in the original economy): consume cs +
(1￿￿s)Ps￿(Cs￿Ct)
ps in period
s and assure the s + 1’th incarnation receives current and future claims coinciding with Ct. That
is, consider the deviation from Cs to ^ Cs; where ^ Cs is given by:
^ Cs = (cs
1;:::cs
s￿1;cs +







^ Cs clearly provides self s with higher utility than does Cs and does not a￿ect future consumption,
contradicting the optimality of Cs.
Regarding money making Dutch Books, note that similar arguments to those used in Lemmas
1 and 2 would imply that for su￿ciently large ￿ C; for any agent (suppressing their index) and for
all s < t; PT ￿ Cs > PT ￿ Ct while PT >> 0: Money making Dutch Books would suggest that
for some agent (suppressing her index), Cs < Ct; where s < t; which as before would lead to a
contradiction. ￿
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